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Résumé
À partir des années 1960, le Québec était prêt 
pour le changement. Au cours de cette décen-
nie, deux visions pour un Québec moderne 
prirent forme et s’affrontèrent, culminant par 
ce qui est connu comme la rencontre la plus 
signifi cative du Canada avec le terrorisme, la 
Crise d’octobre. Pendant que le gouvernement 
libéral nouvellement élu poussait en avant des 
réformes sociales et économiques, le Front de 
libération du Québec (FLQ) émergeait avec 
une vision différente pour le Québec carac-
térisé par l’indépendance et le socialisme. 
Cet article soutient que la modernisation est 
presque toujours accompagnée de transforma-
tions géographiques et de violence. Il examine 
les implications spatiales de la violence du 
FLQ pendant les années 1960 et les réponses 
gouvernementales à la Crise d’octobre afi n 
de fournir une nouvelle compréhension de 
cette crise. 
Abstract
By the 1960s, Quebec was poised for change. 
Two visions of a modern Quebec began to 
emerge that clashed throughout the decade, 
culminating in what has become known as 
Canada’s most significant encounter with 
terrorism: the October Crisis. While the newly 
elected Liberal government pushed forward 
with social and economic reforms, the Front 
de Libération du Québec (FLQ) emerged with 
a different vision for Quebec characterized 
by independence and socialism. This article 
argues that with modernization comes geogra-
phical transformation and violence. It looks at 
the spatial implications of FLQ violence during 
the 1960s and the government’s response to 
the October Crisis as an attempt to provide a 
new understanding of the crisis. 
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Four decades after the October Crisis of 1970, images of the Canadian military occu-
pying the streets of Ottawa, Montreal and Quebec City remain potent. Calling in the 
troops was done to relieve the Montreal and provincial police of some security duties 
and to allow them to devote more resources  to track down the kidnappers of James 
Richard Cross, a British diplomat, and Pierre Laporte, Deputy Premier and Minister 
of Labour for Quebec. Thus, while the Crisis had underlying nationalist and socialist 
echoes, it was at the urban scale, and more particularly in Montreal, that the confl ict 
took place. The military aimed to protect the same spaces that the Front de Libération 
du Québec (FLQ) had targeted throughout years of bombing campaigns; namely, those 
symbolic spaces of Anglophone (British, American and English-Canadian) imperialism, 
culture and economic hegemony. This contested urban terrain became increasingly 
securitized, culminating in both the deployment of the military to protect civilians 
and the October 16 declaration of the War Measures Act (WMA). While the FLQ took 
advantage of a complex urban fabric to outmanoeuvre the police, an intense form of 
spatial control was imposed on this terrain. But while much has been written about 
the history of the crisis, the politics of the time and the lives of the most infl uential 
players, these geographical dimensions have been largely overlooked. 
In recent years, geographical concepts have become important for understanding 
confl ict. Scholarship on critical geopolitics and scale has been crucial in dismantling 
the traditional emphasis on the state as the key player in political struggle. When 
examined within this geographical framework, a new understanding of the October 
Crisis emerges. Furthermore, this particular case raises geographical questions con-
cerning such concepts as the “right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1968) and spatial control 
(Foucault, 2007). By introducing a new geographical perspective that underscores the 
violence of everyday life in Montreal, the view presented in this article supersedes 
the purely historical and political approaches to the crisis.
The social circumstances and the radically changing society of the time played a 
major role in transforming Quebec’s geography, not only in the physical sense but 
in the imaginative sense as well. Therefore, this article will endeavour to trace com-
peting notions of modernity in 1960s Quebec and demonstrate that in the quest for 
modernization, violence became manifest in a spatially signifi cant way. To achieve 
this goal, secondary sources are used to develop a framework for future work on the 
longer history of cities as secure/insecure spaces. This exploratory article seeks to 
open up a perspective for research on the spatial dimensions of violence and security 
practices. It represents one aspect of a larger research project that will ultimately make 
extensive use of archival documents and other primary data. 
The article begins with the presentation of a framework for re-interpreting the Octo-
ber Crisis, seen from a geographical perspective. It goes on to discuss the competing 
concepts of modernization: one orchestrated by the Liberal Party of Quebec, the 
engineers of Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution”, the other promoted by the FLQ.1 Finally, 
it examines the geographical dimensions of the crisis itself. The October Crisis was 
characterized by some of the most controversial government interventions Canada has 
ever experienced. It was a moment in security planning history when civil liberties 
were suspended and tanks rolled through the streets in a demonstration of force and 
power. Cities were treated as war zones, and the police and the military were free 
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to manoeuvre in different ways in order to thwart any terrorist threat. As the army 
patrolled Ottawa, Montreal and Quebec City, a different sense of space as a site of 
struggle emerged in opposition to that presented by the FLQ. 
Reinterpreting the October Crisis
Previous work on the October Crisis has analyzed and interpreted the events from a na-
tional viewpoint. In other words, the crisis has been traditionally construed, especially 
in English Canada (LaPierre, 1971), as a national crisis with sovereigntist overtones. 
The struggle for national liberation has rarely been considered outside a nation-state 
framework and, in the case of the October Crisis, interpretations have tended to focus 
on its national scale, ignoring urban spatial upheaval and the experience of everyday 
life in cities like Montreal. This is not to suggest that the state had no role to play in 
orchestrating the crisis. But the nexus between the urban and the national scales can 
be used more readily to provide a better understanding of the crisis.  
The bridge between the nation and cities is the production of space and scale. As with 
nationalism, scale and space are produced; they are social constructions intertwined 
with politics (Smith, 1992; Marston, 2000). Space is a social product of state and non-
state processes (Lefebvre, 1968), and these processes have material consequences for 
citizens’ daily existence. Concerning scale, the local scale, it has been argued, is the 
actual scale at which the national and international processes that produce social life 
and which shape the urban environment can be observed (Taylor, 1992; Lefebvre, 
1968; Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Brenner, 2000; Smith, 1992; Isin, 2007). Of course, 
this does not discredit the concept of the nation-state as a structural force; it simply 
suggests that the local scale is the most useful scale for understanding the various 
social processes and, more specifi cally, the geography of violence.
The geography of violence is more extensive than the nation-state. In many parts of 
the world, violence is a fact of life and, in its visceral or material form can have a ne-
gative impact on the different segments of a society. Processes of modernization, for 
example, have been linked to violence against cities (Berman, 1996; Gregory, 2003). 
The destruction of rundown neighbourhoods for super-projects and the unequal 
distribution of economic opportunities and social services are a common feature 
of state modernization.  If violence is taken in its broadest sense, then the state’s 
monopoly on violence, both physical and structural, can be legitimized as part of its 
modernization project. The unequal distribution of capital can also result in serious 
public grievances, which in turn can manifest themselves in the form of illegitimate 
violence (Graham, 2004). According to Hardt and Negri (2004), only one distinction 
between types of violence actually matters: the violence that maintains the world 
order and that which challenges it. To understand the spatiality of both terrorist and 
government violence as it pertains to the October Crisis, it is crucial to examine the 
relationship between the nation and the city, the loci of modernity.  
According to Isin (2007:221), “the state emanates from the city, organized through 
it and assembled by it.” He argues that the concept of the state and the nation are 
operationalized in the city by “various symbolic and material practices,” but that the 
city should not simply be imagined as a physical or material space (Ibid.: 221-222). 
Instead, the city should be interpreted as a site of struggle, where local citizens and 
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structural forces such as capitalism, globalization, modernization and nationalism 
are continually transforming urban space and producing new concepts of the city. 
Looked at from this viewpoint, the October Crisis can be seen as a violent struggle 
between the FLQ and the state for control of the city. 
Mitchell (2003:19) describes the right to the city as “the right to the uses of city spaces, 
the right to inhabit.” Harvey (2006) suggests that the concept refers to the ability to 
change the city through collective struggle. In some ways, the Quiet Revolution and 
the October Crisis both concerned the exercise of a “right to the city.” Most of the 
economic grievances, spatial inequalities and language injustices that typifi ed this 
period occurred or stemmed from the particular class and ethnic cleavages that existed 
in Montreal. French was not threatened elsewhere in Quebec; it was in Montreal that 
French unilingualism was a hindrance to economic opportunities and spatial mobility. 
Montreal was also where symbols of colonialism and economic imperialism were 
present and signifi cant. Therefore, the city was not just the backdrop for the crisis, it 
was where people created their identity and enacted citizenship (Isin, 2007: 223). In 
no way does this framework condone the FLQ violence. It simply suggests that the 
FLQ’s violent struggle for a more just society was linked to the right to the city. The 
October Crisis was the brutal climax of this struggle. The only way for the state to 
contain this uprising was to resort to its own form of violence through controversial 
methods of spatial control. 
A brief history
Pre-1960 Quebec
Prior to the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, English-Canadian and American companies 
dominated the Quebec economy. The conservative Union Nationale party, the domi-
nant political party of the time, believed that a laissez-faire economy was the best way 
to accommodate the economic power of the Anglophone population. The Francophone 
majority rarely contested this fait accompli of the Anglophone-controlled economy 
and preferred linguistic peace to any confl ict. This meant that the economic power 
remained in the hands of the wealthy Anglophone elite and limited the economic 
opportunities for Francophones who could not speak English. 
The Catholic Church was also infl uential during this period. It controlled the so-
cial sphere of the Francophones, including education and health care; it urged the 
population to reject the evils of a liberal economy so that they could preserve their 
French-Canadian identity and avoid being assimilated into the North American Eng-
lish-speaking majority. Since the 1759 Conquest, the primary concern of the French-
speaking nation had been “la survivance.” This form of nationalism was characterized 
by the preservation of the traditional French-Canadian culture and way of life based 
largely on language, religion and a rural agrarian lifestyle (Levine, 1990; Laur, 2002; 
Kaplan, 1992). The clergy promoted spatial separation and its ideologies in the Catholic 
education system in order to minimize the threat to cultural survival.
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Quiet Revolution 1960
The situation for Francophones in the province began to change with the onset of 
the “Quiet Revolution.” This period witnessed massive social investment and a trans-
formation of the state. The Quebec government was poised to modernize society and 
improve the socio-economic context of the Francophone majority. The Quiet Revolu-
tion saw a major increase in public-service jobs and consequently, an expansion of the 
Francophone middle-class. Furthermore, school taxes were standardized, substantially 
improving the French school systems (Kaplan, 1992; Levine, 1990). 
Even before the Quiet Revolution, there was a sense that a major societal change was 
in order. Urbanization was rapidly increasing, values were becoming more liberal 
and a fresh feeling of national/cultural identity was beginning to emerge. The French 
language became the major link uniting the nation, while infl uential literature such 
as La revue socialiste and Cité libre, both of which were to become reputable journals, 
argued in favour of Quebec modernity.  
The FLQ’s modern vision, nearly always overshadowed by the Quiet Revolution, also 
embodied the idea of emancipation and advocated a socialist state purged of all class 
divisions. Taking insight from Harvey (2003) there are two competing views of moder-
nity: one put forward by the Francophone bourgeois that proposed a liberal-capitalist 
state run by Francophones, and the other promoted by the Francophone proletariat 
calling for an independent Quebec based on a socialist state structure. It is evident 
that society was ripe for change. However, there were also competing visions for a 
modern Quebec state, both of which advocated a break with tradition. All liberation 
movements seek to eliminate heterogeneity by unifying the nation and expelling the 
colonizer (Fanon, 1963). Shifting the subordinate majority into a position of power 
is, in essence, the premise for such a struggle. In this instance, the governing Libe-
ral party and the FLQ both had different visions for a modern society and different 
methods for transforming it.  
Competing visions of modernity
The Quebec state and modernization 
The Quiet Revolution was part cultural and part ideological (Cohen-Almagor, 2000). 
First, it refl ected the interests of the Francophone majority, which had been econo-
mically subordinate to the English-speaking population, by reaffi rming the right to 
use French in all aspects of social and economic life. Maître chez nous was the slogan 
used during this period to convey the concept of taking economic and social matters 
out of the hands of the clergy and the Anglophone minority and placing them within 
reach of the Francophone majority. Second, it involved social and economic develop-
ment that entailed massive provincial government intervention in the modernization 
of the state. The government expanded its role in health care, welfare and education 
and sponsored many government-owned enterprises and major industrial projects 
(Charters, 1997). 
Despite the centralizing tendencies of the state, the modernization project had much 
in common with capitalistic ideals. However, under capitalism, the benefi ts of mo-
dernization are rarely shared equitably. Quebec represented around 40 percent of 
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the unemployment rate in Canada (Cohen, 1970: 13), while the English-owned banks 
continued to increase their profi ts year after year (Simard, 2000). This particular form 
of modernization engineered by the state came under the umbrella of the liberal ca-
pitalist state (Thériault, 1994) and was at odds with the vision of the FLQ.
The Quiet Revolution ended the ethnic phase of French-Canadian identity and re-
placed it with a more modern, Québécois cultural identity (Simard, 2000). Although 
individualism played an increasingly prominent role, Quebec’s collective identity was 
reinforced and recast in terms of cultural uniqueness. This contradiction occurred in 
conjunction with the growth of the state; the nation became more united, since it was 
now based more on modern public institutions than on traditional ideas of kinship and 
religion. The citizens of Quebec came to be defi ned as a people linked by the French 
language, a common history and a delimited territory, all of which was entrenched 
in the emerging state apparatus. More generally, “the modernization of politics was 
thus as much a process of territorialization as it was a process of secularization and 
rationalization” (Neocleous, 2003: 411). In Quebec, this project involved “nationali-
zing the masses” by initiating a re-conceptualization of the nation as a vast territory 
united in a collective struggle by Francophones wishing to become “masters in their 
own house.” According to Thériault (1994), identity is always transformed when it is 
subject to a modernizing project.
The modernization processes associated with the Quiet Revolution contributed to 
a re-conceptualization of the nation and its territory, laying the foundation for the 
emergence of a competing vision of a modern Quebec based on territorial sovereignty. 
According to Laurendeau (1974: 73), “… [la] révolution tranquille, dont l’objectif était 
l’intégration fonctionnelle et rationnelle du Québec au développement du Canada, a 
fi nalement dépassé son objectif en donnant une vigueur considérable aux aspirations 
indépendantistes.” Therefore, the promotion of Francophone territorial control during 
the Quiet Revolution laid what Neocleous (2003: 411) would call the groundwork for 
sovereignty. Neocleous argues that historically, sovereignty has often been achieved 
through violence. The real potential for violence led the federal government to en-
gage in many questionable and illegal practices against separatist groups, including 
legitimate political parties such as the Parti Québécois (Fidler, 1978). In essence, the 
modernity project, designed broadly to bring stability, justice and prosperity to all, 
triggered a separatist movement within which some factions turned to violence as a 
means of attaining their political goals. This, in turn, forced the government to react 
with repressive measures. Revolution begins in urban spaces and it is within these 
spaces that the FLQ emerged with an alternative vision of the state. 
The FLQ and modernization
Along with the concept of a Francophone-controlled territory in Quebec, the FLQ 
also shared two major visions with the Liberal government of the time: both wanted 
Quebec purged of its clergy, which advocated a life away from politics, and both sought 
to liberate Quebeckers from the economic oppression suffered at the hands of the 
mostly Anglophone upper-class. In its desire to eliminate class divisions, however, 
these visions overstepped the boundaries of modern ideas associated with the Quiet 
Revolution. The FLQ blamed every social ill on colonialism and the church, and social 
reform was considered to be just as necessary as independence (Laurendeau, 1974). 
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As the signs of modernization linked to the Quiet Revolution became apparent, they 
exposed many lingering inequalities (Simard, 2000). For the FLQ, this simply reinfor-
ced the need to establish an independent and socialist Quebec state. In the following 
section of this article, the FLQ’s competing vision for a modern Quebec is discussed 
in relation to left-wing ideology, to revolutionary movements which sprang up at the 
time, and to terrorist violence. 
While the FLQ is mostly remembered as a separatist organization advocating inde-
pendence for the territory (its initial raison d’être), independence based solely on 
nationalism was deemed too restrictive. Consequently, it dissociated itself from poli-
tical jargon such as maître chez nous and built its vision on the idea of class struggle 
and the plight of the working-class. Eliminating the struggle between capitalists and 
the working-class was paramount for their cause and also unusual in Quebec poli-
tics. Thus, the FLQ turned to Marxism as a framework for creating a more equitable 
Quebec society. 
The FLQ’s understanding of the Quebec situation and its vision for improving the 
latter remained forward-looking and, as such, in line with modern thought (Bédard, 
2002). Forward-looking was not synonymous with tabula rasa. Contacts were made 
with all those who had fought on behalf of the Quebec nation in the past (Ibid.). One 
of the myths of modernity is that it signifi es a break, a clean slate, unadulterated by 
the past (Harvey, 2003). But the break did prove not to be quite so clean. The FLQ was 
forced to rely on the masses for support by harking back to memories of their collective 
historical struggle. This struggle, however, connoted a selective appropriation of the 
past as a way to promote the vision of a modern future. Modernity for the FLQ did 
not imply fostering individual development or ignoring a collective past. The FLQ’s 
modern vision did require a subordination of individualism to the collective cause of 
the group and the nation (Bédard, 2002). 
The FLQ believed that using a political framework as a channel for pushing its agenda 
was futile. Politics in a liberal democracy was viewed as a tool to guarantee the survival 
of a bourgeois society, which it wanted to dismantle. Taking their cue from the writings 
of revolutionaries like Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella and the Black 
Panthers, many FLQ members were convinced that only violence could overthrow a 
class-stratifi ed society rooted in colonialism and repression. Vallières (1968:66) be-
lieved that the crux of the societal problem was neither moral nor metaphysical but 
material. Hence, any solution could not be theoretical, it had to be pragmatic. One 
of the FLQ’s goals was to challenge the legitimacy and the root cause of the socio-
political situation rather than orchestrate a coup d’État (Laurendeau, 1974). Its goal 
was to expose repression and cripple the capitalist system. Various factions of the 
FLQ wanted to use shock tactics to dispel people’s feelings of alienation. Only force, 
it believed, could achieve a new sense of nationhood, and the FLQ had a duty to be in 
the vanguard of the struggle (Bédard, 2002). At the same time, violence was believed 
to be the fi nal arbiter when every other means employed by the FLQ to realize its goals 
had failed (Laurendeau, 1974). The FLQ contended that the “system” was inherently 
violent: “Un système d’oppression économique (qu’il soit colonial ou racial) peut se 
perpétuer calmement, sans troubles apparents et être horriblement brutal” (Lauren-
deau, 1974: 21). In other words, political violence was simply a response to structural 
forms of economic and social violence. Nowhere was this dichotomy more apparent 
and more disputed than in Montreal. 
05-Burke.indd   341 2010-02-01   10:49:34
342 Cahiers de géographie du Québec Volume 53, numéro 150, décembre 2009
Spatial dimensions
FLQ actions  
The transformation of social and economic institutions was accompanied by the 
modernization of space. Modernization, however, often leads to disenfranchisement, 
and the FLQ found itself disenfranchised by the particular type of modernization 
taking place in Quebec at the time. The FLQ turned to violence against symbolic 
institutions and businesses in its opposition to the socioeconomic hierarchy. This 
section examines the spatial implications of FLQ violence and the signifi cance of the 
loci of contestation. 
The economic, social and linguistic grievances violently expressed by the FLQ and 
shared by a majority of Francophones were explicitly rooted in urban life. The appal-
ling living conditions in most of Montreal’s Francophone neighbourhoods added to 
these grievances. The city was where the disenfranchised were aware of their subor-
dination to the Anglophone “other” and where the Francophone intelligentsia and 
proletariat started to wake up to their collective oppression as a nation. According to 
Taylor (1970:27), “the image of a society dominated by the Anglo-capitalist elite fi ts 
with the sense of powerlessness which is part of the feeling of alienation.” The violent 
actions committed by the FLQ were a way of shocking people out of their alienation. 
In fact, the FLQ’s actions during the October Crisis garnered a great deal of sympathy 
and support, even if most people refused to condone violence.
Terrorism is almost always an urban phenomenon (Savitch, 2008). Cities are attractive 
terrorist targets for several reasons: they have symbolic value, there is the potential 
for massive destruction and disruption, they are the sites of media attention, and they 
are loci of anonymity (Savitch and Ardashev, 2001). Consequently, a terrorist act must 
be carried out with great attention to geographical detail. 
From 1963 until the October Crisis in 1970, the FLQ carried out a series of bombings, 
targeting symbols of monarchy, colonialism and private American enterprises (Lau-
rendeau, 1974). Bombs are effective in achieving publicity and coercion but they are 
also symbolic. The FLQ attacked military, police, and government buildings, as well 
as specifi c parts of the city such as the wealthy Anglophone neighbourhood of West-
mount. However, according to Charters (1986: 60) the FLQ was unable to devise an 
appropriate strategy for revolution. Consequently, it spent most of its time spreading 
fear by attacking symbolic targets such as the Montreal Stock Exchange, and, until the 
October Crisis, it did not represent a signifi cant threat to the stability of the state. 
This violence was an urban phenomenon, perpetrated more specifi cally in Montreal 
(David and Maheu, 1971). According to Charters (1997: 141) 
most of the incidents (at least 125) occurred in or near Montreal – a clear refl ection of 
the city’s political and economic signifi cance in a modernizing Quebec. The majority of 
the bombings were directed against the property of the federal government (armouries, 
mailboxes, government offi ces, businesses) and, occasionally, transportation links 
(railways and bridges). 
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At this time, Montreal was Canada’s largest city and the hub of its economy. In a city 
strictly divided along economic and linguistic lines and burdened with economic and 
political symbols of Anglophone hegemony, spatial contestation and intimidation 
became a method of asserting control over the city. 
Terrorists often try to attract media attention to their cause. The perpetration of vio-
lent acts in Montreal, the heart of the French-Canadian media, was therefore ideal 
for promoting the FLQ’s cause. Many newspapers offered a sympathetic view of the 
FLQ while others, such as the intellectual newspaper Le Devoir, played a particularly 
antagonistic role during the October Crisis by constantly questioning and challenging 
the federal and provincial governments’ response to the crisis (Lachapelle, 2005). 
Moreover, the media served to further the FLQ’s cause and give prominence to the 
October Crisis. When the FLQ manifesto was broadcast on Radio-Canada, the fi rst 
major link between the FLQ and the people of Quebec had been established. This 
broadcast reached every household and attracted popular support (Crelinsten, 1987: 
70). Furthermore, it forced the government to negotiate in the public arena and en-
dowed the FLQ with political legitimacy.  
Finally, by virtue of being in the city, the FLQ was able to maintain a certain level 
of anonymity. Many of the terrorist acts could be carried out with relative ease, and 
staging the attacks in different parts of the city made it easier to circumvent the autho-
rities. Furthermore, the city is where terrorists fi nd support for their cause. As the 
FLQ obtained wider coverage by a sympathetic French media, support for the FLQ’s 
ideas continued to gain ground. When Pierre Laporte was murdered, however, the city 
literally fell silent. Radwanski and Windeyer (1971) describe the scene in Montreal 
as exceptionally quiet while the usually exuberant public life of the city faded when 
reports of the assassination came in. When the corpse of Pierre Laporte was recovered, 
it dispelled the spontaneous outbreak of revolutionary fantasy (Bédard, 2002), while 
support for the government peaked and sympathy for the FLQ fell dramatically (Auf 
der Maur, 1995). The prospect of any popular revolution or street uprising dimmed 
once the War Measures Act (WMA) was declared (Radwanski, 1971).
Government responses 
During the October Crisis, both the federal and provincial governments’ actions were 
highly contested. Many segments of the population criticized the suspension of ci-
vil liberties through the imposition of the War Measures Act (WMA) as well as the 
military’s occupation of Ottawa, Montreal and Quebec City. Essentially, criminal law 
enforcement was considered inadequate under the circumstances (Maloney, 1997; 
Fidler, 1978; Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 1971). Government response to 
terrorism is practically always about increasing spatial control in terms of heightened 
security rather than addressing some of the fundamental socio-economic malaises 
inherent to any uprising. According to Torrance (1995: 313), “the tendency for demo-
cracies to transform themselves into authoritarian regimes when confronted by violent 
challenges” poses a great danger. This fi nal section looks at the spatial implications 
of the government’s responses to terrorism. 
In the same way as the violent FLQ actions targeted symbolic sites, so the WMA and 
military occupation were symbolic acts. With sympathy for the FLQ continuing to 
grow, government credibility started to wane. These issues had to be resolved, and 
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the calling-in of the military and the declaration of the WMA constituted a symbolic 
show of force designed to intimidate the FLQ and antagonize its sympathizers. Around 
7000 troops were deployed to protect important buildings, high-profi le individuals 
and strategic spaces; “their presence added an eerie aura of war to the already tense 
atmosphere” (Radwanski and Windeyer, 1971: 61). It has been argued that this display 
of force was actually intended to antagonize the sovereignty movement and left-wing 
radicals (Vallières quoted in Charters, 1986; Fidler, 1978; Brodeur, 1980; Whitacker, 
2002). In fact, it was not until the police obtained enough names of people associated 
with left-wing groups that the government was able to justify its request for emergency 
powers (Fidler, 1978). 
Under the WMA, “support for the FLQ was a crime subject to fi ve year’s imprisonment 
but anyone, supporter or not, could be jailed for three weeks without any charge” 
(Haggart and Golden, 1971: 34). The Act allowed for a huge police operation, which led 
to roughly 500 arrests, 238 of them during the fi rst morning (Beaton, 1971, Charters, 
1986), and over 3000 searches (LaPierre, 1971). In addition, public dissent such as 
demonstrations and marches were declared illegal, which effectively gagged support 
for the FLQ cause. According to Lefebvre (2003: 20) “wherever threatened, the fi rst 
thing power restricts is the ability to linger or assemble in the street.” The WMA 
essentially denied the democratic right to dissent in public space and withdrew the 
space where citizenship and identity are enacted. 
After the WMA was declared, basic rights and civil liberties were suspended, a situation 
which could be described as a “state of exception” (Agamben, 1998). According to 
Hannah (2007:59), “the state of exception is not the chaos that precedes order but the 
situation that results from its suspension.” In the week leading up to the declaration 
of the WMA, pandemonium broke out in Montreal: a foreign dignitary and a minis-
ter were abducted, and strikes and rallies declaring support for the FLQ took place. 
Consequently, Prime Minister Trudeau decided to institute a state of exception by 
suspending civil liberties pursuant to the declaration of the WMA and thus restoring 
calm and order to the streets. 
Enactment of legislation like the WMA not only suspends the law and juridical order by 
stripping the population of its rights, but also affects territorial space (Hannah, 2007). 
The WMA is a tactic of sovereignty by which the state geographically exerts control 
over a territory (Butler, 2004). To be able to detain or arrest people, the state must 
exert some form of geographical control over a particular population by suspending 
rights within the framework of emergency powers, or tightening security measures 
in the form of military intervention (Hannah, 2007: 63). As a result, the state was 
able to exploit people’s vulnerabilities and bring them back under the control of the 
authorities.  
The feelings of fear and anxiety present in many aspects of urban life prior to and 
throughout the October Crisis were not provoked by the FLQ but rather by the state, 
the media and the police (LaPierre, 1971). Historically, states have always sought to 
maintain order in their systems by way of security mechanisms such as the military 
and the police (Foucault, 2007: 296). The police, in particular, have always been 
connected with the creation of violence. The October Crisis occurred at a time when 
police brutality, military intimidation and unlawful incarceration were typical of a 
society subject to a state of exception. Most of the arrested were never charged, a 
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fact suggesting that the arrests were never carefully planned but rather an abuse 
of newly granted powers (Cohen-Almagor, 2000). Michel Brault’s fi lm, Les Ordres 
(1974), vividly refl ects the impact of the WMA on the everyday lives of civilians. In 
some cases, those who were unlawfully detained lost their jobs and had their public 
image harmed. The actions of the police, operating under the WMA, affected not only 
individuals and their families, but also entire neighbourhoods known to harbour a 
signifi cant number of separatists and left-wing radicals. 
Although the WMA and military involvement had a high approval rating at the time, 
they received much criticism, too. In Strong and Free: A Response to the War Measures 
Act (1970), several authors claim that the WMA represented a use of excessive force 
for a minor crisis and, as such, was unnecessary. The majority were particularly cri-
tical of the government’s emphasis on security rather than on the underlying social 
and economic grievances that may have caused the uprising. Dissent and the State 
(1989), another related study, puts forward a similar argument: 
The challenge is not for the state to suppress dissent, but for the state to ameliorate the 
problems and conditions that cause it. Only then can a regime prove that it is attempting 
to accommodate the basic human needs and rights that justify its existence. Regimes 
that do this are […] much more secure and legitimate than those dependent on powerful 
security services that control and prevent dissent (Franks, 1989:19). 
Addressing the social and economic ills facing the most marginalized and alienated 
groups was essential if a meaningful solution to the malaises of Quebec society was 
to be found. The FLQ turned to political violence as a way of imposing its own vision 
of a more just society. At the same time, however, a non-violent struggle for national 
liberation and social and economic justice existed that was repressed by military 
occupation and the suspension of civil liberties. In actual fact, it was careful police 
work and not the use of repressive emergency powers that eventually solved the 
kidnapping cases. 
Conclusion
This exploratory article shows clearly that there is a history of violence and security 
peculiar to cities, a topic rarely explored from a geographical perspective. Its aim is 
to suggest that a geographical inquiry into the October Crisis offers a potentially new 
outlook on this signifi cant moment in Canadian history. By looking beyond the po-
litical and historical aspects of the crisis and focusing on its geographical and spatial 
aspects, it is possible to reinterpret the crisis as an “urban” struggle transcending the 
nation-state. 
The context of this struggle was Montreal. In the 1960s Montreal was a polarized city 
where Francophones and Anglophones hailed from different social backgrounds; the 
impoverished working-class Francophones from the east side of the city, the wealthy 
Anglophones from the west. Poverty was geographical, and political power ensured 
that it stayed this way. According to Agamben (1998), the “good life” was achieved by 
social exclusion.  Indeed, Montreal was founded precisely on a policy of marginalizing 
those who were politically neutral. And so Anglophones were able to maintain their 
economic hegemony. Not only did they control the economy but they also wielded 
considerable power and infl uence in political circles.
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By the 1960s, this traditional confi guration was challenged. The swearing-in of a new 
government determined to modernize Quebec after decades of conservative rule and 
clerical infl uence gave hope to some of the most deprived people in the province. The 
government’s aim was to modernize the province by introducing a variety of social 
and economic measures that would improve the living conditions of its citizens. The 
FLQ’s reaction to these measures involved a particular form of political violence.  
While the FLQ did not reject progress, its vision for a modern Quebec was based on 
a different paradigm: it used violent means to advance its own political agenda and 
to challenge what it perceived to be symbols of colonial and economic oppression. 
By 1963, there was fi ghting on the streets of Montreal contesting many of the sym-
bols and spaces that the FLQ saw as instances of structural violence. This collective 
struggle centred on the right of a Francophone majority to a city dominated by an 
Anglophone minority. Years of FLQ violence culminated in the October crisis and the 
assassination of Pierre Laporte. During this period, the deployment of troops and the 
subsequent declaration of the WEA sought to address what was construed not only 
as an insurrection but also an attempt to intimidate the public symbolically. Hence, 
aspects of normal life became vulnerable to state power (Hannah, 2007), and people 
expressing views that were left-wing or separatist came in for special attention. For 
months on end, the FLQ was able to outwit the police by hiding out in the city inco-
gnito, a clear sign that the WMA contained loopholes. Millions of citizens had their 
civil liberties suspended, while the few kidnappers were still on the run. The WMA, 
instead of acting as a response to the social and economic ills that likely triggered 
dissent in the fi rst place, only widened the spaces of government control. 
By approaching the October Crisis from a geographical perspective, a new understan-
ding of this event emerges. The crisis can now be interpreted as a struggle between 
the right to a city and spatial control. This approach also highlights the self-contra-
dictory role of the city as a space of both liberation and disempowerment. Montreal 
was a locus for collective uprising as well as the site of various forms of oppression 
and subordination. Viewed this way, the scope of the October Crisis can be expanded 
beyond the traditional nation-state perspective to reveal a more nuanced relationship 
between modernity, violence and the city. 
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Notes
1 This is not to suggest that there were only two competing notions of modernity at the 
time. Other sectors of Quebec society were also promoting a signifi cant socialist ideology. 
Research on the geography of violence shows that the confl ict between the modern visions 
of the Liberal Party and the FLQ is the more important.   
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